Collective Wisdom : Principles and mechanisms

For those interested, (the preliminary version of) the contributed papers to the colloquium "Collective Wisdom : Principles and mechanisms" (held on 22-23 may 2008) are online.

Perspectives philosophiques sur l'agrégation des jugements

Séminaire « Perspectives philosophiques sur l'agrégation des jugements »
Lundi 30 juin 2008 à l'IHPST et Mardi 1 juillet à l' Université Paris-Dauphine (détails ci-dessous)

Programme
Lundi 30 juin | Lieu : Institut d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques, 13 rue du Four, 75006 Paris (métro Mabillon). Grande salle, 2e étage
14h-15h30: Mikaël Cozic (IHPST & GREGHEC, Paris)« Une introduction à la théorie de l'agrégation logique »
15h30-17h : Philippe Mongin (GREGHEC & IHPST, Paris)« Quelques difficultés inattendues du principe d'unanimité de Pareto »
17h-18h30 : Christian List (London School of Economics)« Group Deliberation and the Revision of Judgments: An Impossibility Result »
Atelier « Theory of Logical Aggregation »

Mardi 1er juillet 2008 | Lieu : Université Paris-Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75116 Paris (métro Porte Dauphine). Salle A 709 de la nouvelle aile (bâtiment A).

9h30-11h : Elad Dokow (Technion, Haifa) et Ron Holzman (Technion, Haifa & Paris-Dauphine) « Aggregation of Non-Binary Evaluations: Towards a Characterization of Impossibility Domains »
11h-12h30 : Franz Dietrich (Universiteit de Maastricht & London School of Economics) et Philippe Mongin (GREGHEC & IHPST, Paris)« The Premiss-Based Approach to Judgment Aggregation » (voir ici)
14h-15h30 : Klaus Nehring (University of California at Davis) et Clemens Puppe (Universität Karlsruhe)« Efficient Judgment Aggregation » (voir ici
16h-17h30 : Franz Dietrich (Universiteit Maastricht & London School of Economics) et Christian List (London School of Economics)« Majority Voting on Restricted Domains » (voir ici)

Paris-Oxford Workshop

Paris-Oxford Workshop
LANGUAGE & ONTOLOGY
June 26-28 2008, grande salle de l'IHPST, 13 rue du Four, Paris
Program here

Notre Dame Mathematical Lectures

In Notre Dame Mathematical Lectures series, one finds (.pdf):

Skolem : Abstract Set Theory (1962)
Curry : A Theory of Formal Deducibility(1950)

Sider's Logic for Philosophy (update)

Here's an updated link to Ted Sider's draft : Logic for Philosophy

[h.t. David Nicolas]

Thibault Gajdos

Lundi 9 juin (14h-16h), le séminaire Philform (IHPST) reçoit Thibault Gajdos(CNRS-Paris 1):

"The Ignorant Observer"

Most prominent models of economic justice (and especially those proposed by Harsanyi and Rawls) are based on the assumption that impartiality is required for making moral decisions. However, although Harsanyi and Rawls agree on that and furthermore agree on the notion that impartiality can be obtained under appropriate conditions of ignorance, they strongly disagree on the consequences of these assumptions. According to Harsanyi, they provide a justification for the utilitarian doctrine, whereas Rawls considers that they imply egalitarianism. We propose here an extension of Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem, that is based on the representation of ignorance as the set of all possible probability distributions over individuals. We obtain a characterization of the observer's preferences that, under our most restrictive conditions, is a convex combination of Harsanyi's and Rawls' criteria. Furthermore, this representation is ethically meaningful, in the sense that individuals' utilities are cardinally measurable and fully comparable. This allows us to conclude that the impartiality requirement cannot be used to decide between Rawls' and Harsanyi's positions. Finally, we defend the view that a (strict) combination of Harsanyi's and Rawls' criteria provides a reasonable rule for social decisions.

"Mathematical Understanding"

Workshop « Mathematical Understanding » | 9-13 juin 2008
Département Histoire et Philosophie des Sciences, Université Denis Diderot Paris 7,
Les Grands Moulins, Salle du Campanile, Accès C - 8ème étage.
10 Esplanade des Grands Moulins - Paris 13ème ardt.
Plans et itinéraires

Programme
Lundi 9 juin
9h30-11h00 :Jeremy Gray (Open University London)« Understanding [and] Riemann surfaces »
11h15-12h45 : Karine Chemla (CNRS Rehseis)« Understanding while proving the correctness of algorithms. Reflexions based on ancient Chinese sources »
14h30-16h00 : Alain Michel (Université d’Aix-Marseille) « La théorie de la mesure: origines et prolongements »
16h15-17h45 : Renaud Chorlay (Université de Paris 8 - Rehseis)« Making sense of it with structures : the mathematical (and philosophical) background to Charles Ehresmann's work »
18h00-19h30 : Andrei Rodin (Université Denis Diderot de Paris 7)« Category theory, Mathematical Structuralism and Mathematical Hermeneutics »
Mardi 10 juin
14h00-15h30 : Ken Manders (University of Pittsburgh)« On Mathematical Understanding »
15h45-17h15 : Catherine Goldstein (CNRS, Institut de Mathématiques, Paris 6)« Charles Hermite, Mathematical Understanding and Mathematical Nature »
17h30-19h00 :Ivahn Smadja (Université Denis Diderot Paris 7)« Diverging Thrusts. Contrasting Insightful Plasticity with Articulate Embeddings »
Mercredi 11 juin
9h30-11h00 : Jeremy Avigad (Carnegie Mellon)« The role of the diagram in Euclid's Elements »
11h15-12h45 : Philippe Nabonnand (Université de Nancy 2)« La polémique entre Poncelet et Von Staudt : comprendre la dualité »
14h30-16h00 : Gerhard Heinzmann (Université de Nancy 2)« Mathematical Comprehension and Intuition »
16h15-17h45 : Mark Steiner (University of Jerusalem)« Getting more out of mathematics than we put in: the case of complex numbers and their generalizations »
18h00-19h30 :Michel Paty (CNRS Rehseis)« La structure du rationnel dans l’invention de la théorie de la relativité et de la théorie quantique »
Jeudi 12 juin
9h30-11h00 : Jan von Plato (University of Helsinki)« A combinatorial view of mathematical proofs »
11h15-12h45 : Joël Merker (ENS Ulm, DMA & LATP)« Insights towards the speculative thought of formal computation »
14h30-16h45 : Andrew Arana (Kansas State University) & Mic Detlefsen (University of Notre-Dame)« Purity and Understanding »
17h-18h30 :Jean-Jacques Szczeciniarz (Université Denis Diderot Paris 7)« Le galoisisme de Grothendieck »
Vendredi 13 juin
9h30-11h00 : Paolo Mancosu (University of Berkeley)« Understanding, Explanation and Unification »
11h15-12h45 : Stewart Shapiro (Ohio State University)« An 'i' for an i. Reference and indiscernibility »
14h30-16h00 : Marco Panza (CNRS, Rehseis)« From naturals to reals using abstraction »
16h15-17h45 José Ferreiros (University of Sevilla)« Conceptual understanding, logical consistency, and mathematical existence »
18h Discussion générale

Newton international fellowships

Newton international fellowships. The closing date for the first round of applications is 4 August 2008.

YouTube Classics

On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1


Hilary Putnam on the Philosophy of Science: Section 1


Searle on the Philosophy of Language : Section 1



Ayer on Frege and Russell :

Lucie Menager

lundi prochain 26 mai de 14h à 16h dans la grande salle de l'IHPST, Philform reçoit Lucie Ménager (Paris II): "La connaissance interactive en économie et en théorie des jeux"

P. Mancosu

La prochaine séance du séminaire général de l'IHPST se tiendra le jeudi 22 mai (à l'IHPST) de 11H à 13H. Paolo Mancosu (Université de Berkeley) fera une conférence sur le sujet suivant :
"Quine and Tarski on nominalism"

Le même jour à l'ENS, salle Weil à 16h, se tiendra la première séance de son séminaire sur les théories de la vérité.

Abstract (Quine and Tarski on nominalism):

Quine and Tarski were kindred philosophical spirits. They rejected the
analytic/synthetic distinction and shared a strong distaste for modal
notions. Moreover, both had nominalistic leanings. In this talk I
trace the nominalistic engagement of these two giants of contemporary
analytic philosophy. Using recently discovered materials from the
Quine archive at Harvard, I begin by describing Quine's engagement
with nominalism up to 1940. I will then summarize the impact of the
1940-1941 discussions on nominalism between Carnap, Quine and Tarski
and mention their influence on Goodman. The third part of the talk
will be on Quine's allegiance to nominalism and his subsequent
reluctant acceptance of Platonism. The fourth part of the talk will
then focus on Tarski's defense of nominalism in Amersfoort in 1953.
Finally, I will compare Quine's and Tarski's approaches to nominalism
with some contemporary nominalistic programs (Field, Hellman etc.)

Albert J.J. Angelberger

Albert J.J. Angelberger (Salzburg) est l'invité du séminaire Philform ce lundi 19 mai 2008 : "Dynamic Deontic Logic".

Handbook on the philosophy of information

Versions of the chapters are online here.
"This handbook is one volume in a 14 volumes set entitled Handbook of the philosophy of science, dealing with all aspects of the philosophy of science.
This multi-volume Handbook is to be published by Elsevier under the general editorship of Dov Gabbay, Paul Thagard, and John Woods. Editors : Johan van Benthem, Pieter Adriaans

Thomas Forster

Found on T.E. Forster's page.



As a matter of fact, I'm reading Forster's nice book Logic, Induction, and Sets and was looking for a list of errata. A list that, unfortunately, I didn't find.
If you're familiar with the book, by the way, I was concerned with the second paragraph on page 59 : ok, on the third line, I guess, "continuous" should be replaced by "complete" and on the tenth line, it is the set of fn(x) for *n* in N that is of interest (I write fn(x) for the nth iteration of the function f). But on line 6-7, what's going on exactely ? Is it tacitly assumed that x is sound in the sense that x≤ f(x) [for the sup of {x, fx, etc} to be a fixed point of the continuous operator f defined on a poset assumed to be chain-complete] ? Or does it have something to do with inflationary functions, defined a few pages earlier ? The intuition on continuity is, I think, clear enough, but I'm a bit baffled by the details of the development of the discussion in this paragraph.

Abramsky & Jung on Domain Theory

A corrected and expanded version of Abramsky & Jung's survey for the Handbook for logic in computer sciences is available online: Domain Theory

M. Gomez-Torrente

Mercredi à 17h30 à l'IHPST, le séminaire Philmath reçoit M. Gomez-Torrente (Philosophie, Université de Mexico) :
"Rereading Tarski on Logical Consequence"

Le matin M. Gomez-Torrente donnera un premier exposé de 10h à 12h en salle de réunion du DEC-IJN, sur le thème
"The Sorites, Linguistic Preconceptions, and the Dual Picture of Vagueness".

Abstract ( Rereading Tarski on Logical Consequence):
I will argue against some recent defenses of the view that, in 1936, Tarski always required all interpretations of a language to share one same domain of quantification. I hope to offer a more detailed examination of some of the relevant textual evidence on the issue than in my earlier work. If time permits, I will also offer some new considerations on subsisting issues of interpretation concerning Tarski's views on the logical correctness of certain omega arguments, on the Tarskian proof that Etchemendy took to be modal and fallacious, or on Tarski's appeals to the "common concept of consequence".

Survey (2)

A results sheet for the online toy survey on Existence and circularity can be found here and will be regularly updated.
[see the post below on do-it-yourself surveys using google docs]

Créer un questionnaire en ligne

Julien a eu récemment la bonne idée de poster sur son blog un lien vers un message de Mikaël qui indiquait lui-même une page du XPhi Blog expliquant comment créer facilement un questionnaire en ligne.
Un exemple très rudimentaire ici :
Existence and circularity

M. Detlefsen à l'IHPST

La prochaine séance du séminaire général de l’IHPST se tiendra le 24 avril de 11h à 13h à l’IHPST, 13, rue du Four (75006 Paris).
Michael Detlefsen interviendra sur le thème suivant:
"On the nature and value of construction"

Abstract: In this paper various notions of construction are examined and their possible roles in the justification of mathematical beliefs considered.

Semantics and Philosophy in Europe

SPE colloquium will take place in Paris, May 2-4, 2008.
Arché (St Andrews), the IHPST/Chaire d'Excellence 'Ontological Structure and Semantic Structure' (Paris), Logos (Barcelona), and CSMN (Oslo) are organizing new annual colloquium 'Semantics and Philosophy in Europe' (SPE).

The purpose of the colloquium is to enhance the dialogue between linguists and philosophers and to provide a new forum for presenting research in the interface between linguistic semantics and the various related areas of philosophy (philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of mind). The colloquium is to take place every year, alternating between Paris, St Andrews, Barcelona, and Oslo.