Sunday, March 23, 2008

H. Leitgeb

Mardi 25 mars, de 16h à 18h, Philform recevra Hannes Leitgeb :
On the Justification of Objectivist Bayesianism
(joint paper with Richard Pettigrew)
The fundamental problem of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent's possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper, we defend an Objectivist Bayesian's solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Try to get as close to the truth as possible; in other words: minimize inaccuracy.
We make the underlying notion of inaccuracy mathematically precise, and derive the tenets of Objectivist Bayesianism from the mathematical version of the norm. Finally, we use our account of accuracy to assess Richard Jeffrey's proposed generalization of part of the Bayesian creed, and identify a weakness in his proposal.